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LIST OF PARTIES 
The names of all parties to the proceedings before the 
district court below are contained in the caption. 
Plaintiffs Tim P. Bennett, Dale R. Bennett, and Bennett 
and Economy Sanitation, Inc., will be referred to 
collectively as "Bennetts". Defendant Grant S. Huish will 
be referred to as "Huish", and Defendant Utah Funding and 
Loan, Inc., as "Utah Funding". Huish and Utah Funding will 
sometimes be referred to jointly as the "Defendants". 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is based on 
the provisions of U.C.A., §78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court correctly conclude that the 
statute of frauds (U.C.A., §25-5-3) does not apply to an 
agreement unrelated to the lease or sale of real property? 
(R. 246). 
Standard of review: The applicability of the 
statute of frauds is a question of law to be reviewed for 
correctness. Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d 742, 750 (Utah 2002). 
2. Did the trial court act within its discretion in 
concluding that even if the statute of frauds did apply to 
an agreement unrelated to the lease or sale of real 
property, the statute was satisfied by the written closing 
statement signed by Bennetts? (R. 246). 
Standard of review: The trial court's application 
of a statute to the facts of a particular case is reviewed 
for abuse of discretion. Arls Vision Institute, Inc. v. 
Wasatch Property Management, Inc., 121 P.3d 24, 28 (Utah 
App. 2005). 
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3. Did the trial court act within its discretion in 
holding that, even if the statute of frauds applied and was 
not satisfied by the signed writing, Defendants waived the 
statute of frauds defense by failing to assert it until 2 
days prior to trial? (R. 246). 
Standard of review: A finding of waiver of a legal 
right is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Aspenwood, 
L.L.C. v. C.A.T., L.L.C., 73 P.3d 947, 954 (Utah App. 
2003) . 
4. In finding that the closing statement was not an 
integrated agreement, did the trial court commit clear 
error? (R. 134). 
Standard of review: Issues relating to whether the 
parties to a writing adopted it as a complete integration of 
their agreement are factual in nature and are reviewed under 
a clearly erroneous standard. Spears, supra., 44 P. 3d at 
750. 
5. Did the trial court act within its discretion in 
determining that the closing statement was ambiguous? (R. 
134) . 
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Standard of review: Whether ambiguity exists in a 
contract is a question of law, WebBank v. American General 
Annuity Service Corp., 54 P.3d 1139, 1145 (Utah 2002); 
however, in reaching that conclusion, the trial court is 
required to decide whether the parties' opposing 
interpretations are each reasonably supported by the 
language of the contract, Ward v. Intermountaln Farmers 
Association, 907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1995); and the 
application of the law to the facts of the case is reviewed 
for abuse of discretion. Arls, supra, 121 P.3d at 28. 
6. Was it correct for the trial court to consider 
parol evidence regarding an ambiguous provision in a 
non-integrated writing? (R. 134) . 
Standard of review: Whether to admit parol 
evidence is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. 
Spears, supra, 44 P.3d at 750. 
7. Did the trial court act within its discretion in 
concluding that Huish had breached his fiduciary duty to 
Bennetts? (R. 135). 
Standard of review: The trial court's application 
of the law to the facts of a particular case is reviewed for 
-3-
abuse of discretion. Aris, supra, 121 P. 3d at 28. 
8. Did the trial court act within its discretion in 
concluding that Huish and Utah Funding converted funds 
belonging to the Bennetts? (R. 135-136). 
Standard of review: The trial court's application 
of the law to the facts of a particular case is reviewed for 
abuse of discretion, Arls, supra, 121 P.3d at 28. 
9. Was the trial court's decision to assess punitive 
damages clearly erroneous? (R. 136-140) 
Standard of review: Punitive damages are allowed 
where there is conduct which manifests a knowing and 
reckless indifference toward, and disregard for, the rights 
of others. Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 
789, 807 (Utah 1991). Since this requires the trial court 
to make a factual determination of the defendants' mental 
state and intentions, the reviewing court reverses only if 
it concludes that the determination was clearly erroneous. 
Spears, supra, 44 P.3d at 750. 
10. Have the Defendants presented sufficient evidence 
to overcome the presumption of correctness of the trial 
court's punitive damages award, which was under $100,000 and 
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less than three times the actual damages? (R. 136-139). 
Standard of review: Whether punitive damages are 
excessive is reviewed de novo, Smith v. Fairfax Realty, 
Inc., 82 P.3d 1064, 1072 (Utah 2003); however, where an 
award of punitive damages is well below $100,000, and is 
also less than three times the amount of actual damages, it 
is entitled to a presumption of correctness. Crookston v. 
Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 811 (Utah 1991). 
11. Did the trial court err in awarding prejudgment 
interest? (R. 138). 
Standard of review: The decision to award 
prejudgment interest is a question of law, reviewed for 
correctness. Carlson Distributing Co. v. Salt Lake 
Brewing Co., L.C. , 95 P.3d 1171, 1176 (Utah App. 2004). 
12. Did the trial court act within its discretion in 
holding that Huish waived the corporate shield defense by 
failing to assert it until after trial? (R. 162, 245). 
Standard of review: A finding of waiver of a legal 
right is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Aspenwood, 
I.L.C. v. C.A.T., L.L.C., 73 P.3d 947, 954 (Utah App. 
2003). 
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13. Was the trial court correct in holding that even 
if Huish had not waived the corporate shield defense, he was 
personally liable for his own actions in breaching his 
fiduciary duty to Bennetts and converting their funds? (R. 
245) . 
Standard of review: Questions of law are reviewed 
for correctness. Spears, supra., 44 P. 3d at 750. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ETC. 
The only constitutional provision, statute, ordinance, 
rule or regulation whose interpretation is determinative of 
the appeal or of central importance to the appeal is the 
applicable Statue of Frauds, Utah Code Ann., §25-5-3: 
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period 
than one year, or for the sale, of any lands, or 
any interest in lands, shall be void unless the 
contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, is 
in writing subscribed by the party by whom the 
lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful 
agent thereunto authorized in writing. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In May, 2000, Bennetts met Huish for the first time. 
(See trial court's Findings of Fact (hereinafter "FOF"), 23, 
R. 127) . It was at a loan closing. (Id.) Huish was a 
loan broker for a lender named Robert Kent, dba UTCO. (Id.) 
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The loan to Bennetts was for $1.2 million at 18% for 90 days 
(the "UTCO Loan"). (FOF 11, 3; R. 126-127). The purpose 
of the UTCO Loan was to buy industrial property on Beck 
Street to operate Bennetts' sanitation business and an auto 
salvage business. (Id.) 
Up until closing, Bennetts had expected the UTCO Loan 
to be for 1 year. (FOF 12-3; R. 127). The 90-day term was 
too short. (FOF 14; R. 127). Bennetts would have walked 
away from the loan but for promises made to them by Huish at 
closing that he had a long term replacement loan for them 
which would fund in 45 days or less. (FOF 14; R. 127). 
Based on those promises, Bennetts accepted the UTCO Loan and 
Huish was paid a commission of $72,000. (FOF 15; R. 127-
128; Tr. 171). 
Huish instructed Bennetts at closing that they were to 
have no contact with UTCO, but were to deal only through 
him, Huish. (FOF 16; R. 129). All payments on the UTCO 
Loan were made by Bennetts to Huish to be delivered to UTCO. 
(FOF 16, 8, 9, 10, 14; R. 129, 131, 134). 
There was no long term loan. (FOF 18; R. 129). At 
the end of the 90 days, Bennetts paid an $18,000 rollover 
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fee to extend the $1.2 million loan an additional 30 days. 
{Id.). Bennetts believed all this money went to UTCO, but 
without their knowledge or consent, Huish kept $6,000 of it 
for himself. (FOF fQ; R. 129-130). Huish was able to keep 
this money because he had authority from Robert Kent to set 
the amount of the rollover fees. (Id.) He never disclosed 
this to Bennetts. (FOF 18, 14; R. 129-130, 134). 
During the 30-day extension, Bennetts paid UTCO 
approximately $227,000 in principal paydowns. (FOF $9; R. 
131). They obtained this money by borrowing against other 
properties owned by them. (Id.) At the end of the 30-day 
extension, Bennetts paid an additional $93,308, to be 
applied against interest and principal, and to obtain a 
60-day extension. (FOF 510, R. 131). 
Bennetts believed the entire $93,308 would be paid to 
UTCO, but Huish kept approximately $19,000 for himself, 
without their knowledge or consent. (FOF 510, R. 131-132). 
All during the original 90-day term of the UTCO Loan, 
and through the 30-day and 60-day extensions, Huish was 
promising Bennetts that their long-term loan would soon 
close. (FOF, 8-10; R. 129-132). 
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When the 60-day extension expired at the end of 
October, 2000, Bennetts borrowed $70,000 to extend the UTCO 
Loan one more time. (FOF 512; R. 132). Huish acted as 
their agent in procuring the $70,000 loan, and he prepared 
the loan documents, including written disbursement 
instructions (hereinafter referred to as the "closing 
statement"). (FOF 512; R. 132-134). The closing statement 
(a copy of which is included in the Addendum to Appellant's 
Brief as Exhibit A) included a line item for $27,955.98 to 
be paid to Utah Funding for "30 day Loan extension Beck 
Street." (Id.) Utah Funding was a company owned and 
controlled by Huish. (FOF $8; R. 129-130). 
Before signing the closing statement, Bennetts asked 
Huish what the $27,955.98 was for. (Tr. 45-47). He told 
them it would be used, in part, as a 30-day rollover for the 
month of November. (FOF 514/ R. 133-134 (note: pages 133 
and 134 in the Record are out of order). He assured them 
that the long-term loan he had supposedly been working on 
all these months would close before Thanksgiving. (FOF 512; 
R. 132). He further told them that if, for some reason, 
the closing was delayed into December, then a portion of the 
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$27,955.98 would be used to extend the $1.2 million loan 
through closing. (FOF $12, 14; R. 132-134) . Any remainder 
would be used as a prepayment to Huish on his commission for 
obtaining the long-term loan. (Id.) Any portion of the 
$27,955.98 not used for rollover fees to UTCO or as a 
commission to Huish for the long-term loan would be returned 
to Bennetts. (Id.) 
Contrary to his representations, Huish paid $9,314 from 
the $27,955.98 to UTCO and kept the balance ($18,641.98) for 
himself. (FOF 514; R. 134). 
Thanksgiving came and went. There was still no 
long-term loan. (FOF 515; R. 134). Huish told Bennetts 
UTCO was demanding $50,000 as a rollover fee for December. 
(Id.) Huish, not Robert Kent, set the rollover fee at 
$50,000 for December. (Id.) Huish did not have a long-term 
loan for Bennetts and he knew that Bennetts had exhausted 
their borrowing ability. (Id.) Huish did not disclose to 
the Bennetts that he had authority from Kent to set the 
amount of the rollover fees. (FOF f14-15; R. 134). 
Bennetts had no more money. (Id.) They filed for 
Chapter 11 protection on December 6 and requested return of 
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the $27,955.98, but Huish refused to return the money. (FOF 
515, 16; R. 134-135). Bennetts have since had the Beck 
Street property repossessed, along with several other 
properties that were mortgaged to make the paydowns to UTCO. 
(FOF 115; R. 134-135). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Huish was acting as Bennetts' agent, both to deal with 
UTCO and to find a long-term loan. As their agent, Huish 
owed a fiduciary duty to Bennetts. He breached that duty by 
failing to disclose his authority to set rollover fees for 
UTCO, by failing to disclose that he was taking ongoing 
commissions for himself from Bennetts' payments to UTCO, by 
setting the $50,000 December rollover fee at an amount he 
knew they could not pay, and by keeping $18,641.98 of 
Bennetts' funds. In addition, Huish and Utah Funding 
converted Bennetts' funds when they refused to return the 
funds after demand by Bennetts. Pre-judgment interest on 
$18,641.98 should be assessed because the amount of damages 
was certain as of the date Bennetts demanded return of the 
funds. 
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Punitive damages were properly assessed against Huish 
because he took advantage of Bennetts with knowing and 
reckless indifference towards, and disregard of, their 
rights. The amount of the punitive damages was proper 
because (1) Huish's conduct showed a pattern of disregard 
for the rights of others, (2) his attitude at trial 
reflected a lack of remorse and an intention to continue 
operating in the same manner, (3) his wrongful conduct 
harmed Bennetts to a much greater extent than the damages 
awarded to them, and (4) the amount of punitive damages was 




DEFENDANTS CANNOT RELY 
ON THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
TO PROTECT THEM FROM THEIR 
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 
AND CONVERSION 
A. The Statute of Frauds Does Not Apply. 
The trial court concluded that the statute of frauds 
does not apply in this case, (R. 246) This was a 
conclusion of law to be reviewed for correctness. Spears, 
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supra, 44 P.3d at 750. 
The applicable section of the statute of frauds 
provides as follows: 
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period 
than one year, or for the sale, of any lands, or 
any interest in lands, shall be void unless the 
contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, is 
in writing subscribed by the party by whom the 
lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful 
agent thereunto authorized in writing. 
U.C.A. §25-5-3 (emphasis added). 
The agreement at issue in this case was not a contract 
for the leasing or sale of lands or any interest in lands. 
Rather, the agreement was that Huish, as agent, would apply 
money belonging to Bennetts, as principals, in one of three 
ways: (1) pay an extension fee or interest to UTCO; (2) pay 
himself a commission in the event he obtained a long term 
loan for Bennetts; or (3) return the money to Bennetts. 
(FOF 514; R. 134). 
The agreement between Huish and Bennetts is not within 
the statute of frauds. In Corbet v. Corbet, All P.2d 430 
(Utah 1970), a former husband and wife had been partners in 
a family business. 472 P.2d at 431. In a lawsuit for 
termination and accounting of the family business, the 
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husband claimed the wife had promised to transfer title to 
her separately owned ranch to the two of them jointly. Id., 
at 432. The wife argued any such promise was void by the 
statute of frauds. Id. The Utah Supreme Court held that 
since the ranch had been sold prior to the accounting, the 
statute of frauds did not apply, because "what the court was 
really concerned with was the proceeds of the sale." Id. 
The present case is the same as Corbet. Bennetts' 
agreement to mortgage land to WaterPro may have been subject 
to the statute of frauds, but Bennetts' agreement with Huish 
to disburse some of the proceeds of the WaterPro loan was 
not. It was an agreement concerning money, not the sale or 
lease of lands or an interest in lands. 
The result in Corbet is consistent with the law in 
other states. In Pagano v. Ippolltl, 716 A.2d 848 (Conn. 
1998), two employees sued to enforce a verbal contract 
promising them 20% of the proceeds of sale of their 
employer's real estate development in exchange for their 
services. 716 A.2d at 850. Defendants argued that the 
statute of frauds barred enforcement of the verbal contract, 
but the Connecticut Supreme Court disagreed. The court held 
-14-
that the plaintiffs had alleged, and proven, breach of a 
contract for the payment of money, not for the transfer of 
real property. Id., at 853. Because the agreements were 
not directly concerned with transferring real estate, the 
statute of frauds did not apply. Id. 
In Wright & Souza, Inc. v. DM Properties, 510 N.W.2d 
413 (Neb. App. 1993), the court held that the statute of 
frauds did not apply to an agreement for the payment of a 
fee to a mortgage loan broker: 
An oral agreement between parties to obtain 
refinancing for an existing loan which is to be 
secured by real estate mortgages does not 
constitute a sale of land within the statute of 
frauds. 
Wright & Souza, supra, 510 N.W.2d at 418 (emphasis added) . 
The reasoning of Wright & Souza applies to the present 
case. An agreement to pay a fee or commission does not 
become subject to the statute of frauds just because it has 
some tangential relationship to a deed of trust against real 
property. As the court stated in the case of Bridewell v. 
Prltchett, 562 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. App. 1978): "Neither is the 
statute [of frauds] applicable because a real estate 
transaction is merely incidentally involved.7' Id. , at 958; 
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accord, Cline v. Lee, 581 S.E.2d 558, 562 (Ga.App. 2003). 
Defendants cite Fisher v. Fisher, 907 P. 2d 1172 (Utah 
App. 1995) in support of their proposition that escrow 
agreements are covered by the statute of frauds. In Fisher, 
the escrow agreement was established to transfer land: "On 
or about May 1, 1974, the Fishers conveyed approximately 600 
acres (the property) to appellees, pursuant to a written 
escrow agreement." Fisher, supra, 907 P.2d at 1174 
(emphasis added). 
In Fisher, the escrow agreement was required to be in 
writing, not because it was an escrow agreement, but because 
it related to the conveyance of real property. Utah Code 
Ann., f25-5-3, quoted in Fisher, supra, at 1176. 
Similarly, in Miguel v. Belzeski, 1995 WL 704769 (7th 
Cir. 1995) (which is also relied on by Huish), the escrow 
was established for the delivery of deeds to real property. 
Id., at **1 (see copy of the Miguel opinion attached to 
Appellant's Brief as Exhibit C). The Defendants argue in 
the Appellant's Brief that "[t]he Miguel court recognized 
that the statute of frauds applies to escrow agreements and 
not just to conveyances of land." (Appellant's Brief at 
-16-
19). This argument is misplaced. The Miguel court, like 
the Fisher court, was dealing with an escrow relating to 
conveyances of real estate. Id., at **1. The court in 
Miguel applied the Illinois statute of frauds precisely 
because the case involved holding deeds to real property. 
As the court stated: 
Unfortunately for Plaintiffs, Illinois law 
requires that the escrow arrangements be evidenced 
by a writing. The Illinois statute of frauds 
provides that an action for the sale of land 
cannot be maintained unless the contract or some 
memorandum or note thereof is in writing, signed 
by the party to be charged. 
Miguel, supra., at **6 (emphasis added) . 
From the foregoing cases, it is clear that the decisive 
factor in determining whether or not the statute of frauds 
applies is whether or not the alleged oral agreement is for 
the sale of lands. If so, the statute of frauds applies; if 
not, the statute does not apply. Since the agreement in 
this case was not for the sale of lands, but rather for the 
use and application of funds, the statute of frauds does not 
apply. 
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B. Even if the Statute of Frauds Applies, It Was Satisfied 
By The Closing Statement. 
The trial court found that, even if the statute of 
frauds applied, which it does not, it was satisfied by the 
closing statement. (R. 246). This finding constitutes the 
application of the law to the facts of the case and as such 
is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Arls, 
supra, 121 P. 3d at 28. As shown below, the court did not 
abuse its discretion. 
The statute of frauds requires "the contract, or some 
note or memorandum thereof, [to be] in writing subscribed by 
the party by whom the lease or sale is to be made, ...'' 
U.C.A., §25-5-3 (emphasis added). 
As found by the trial court, the closing statement (see 
Exhibit A attached to Appellant's Brief) is a note or 
memorandum of the agreement, and it was signed by the 
Bennetts. The Bennetts, not Huish, were the parties by whom 
the encumbrance was to be made in connection with the 
WaterPro loan. 
In Commercial Union Associates v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29 
(Utah App. 1993), the Court of Appeals enforced a long term 
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lease against the lessee, even though it had never been 
signed by the lessee, but only by the lessor. 863 P.2d at 
33. In doing so, the Court of Appeals held that the statute 
of frauds provided by its express terms for an agreement to 
be enforceable against one who had not signed it, so long as 
it was signed by the party selling or leasing the property. 
Id. 
The same rule applies in the present case. The closing 
statement, if indeed the underlying agreement is the type of 
agreement that is subject to the statute of frauds, is 
enforceable against Huish without his signature. 
C. The Statute of Frauds Defense Was Not Timely Raised. 
The trial court held that Defendants waived the statute 
of frauds argument by failing to raise it in a timely 
fashion. (R. 246). A determination that a party has 
waived a legal right is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
Aspenwood, supra, 73 P.3d at 954. 
The statute of frauds is an affirmative defense. 
U.R.C.P., Rule 8(c). As such, it must be raised in the 
answer or it is waived. ProMax Development Coirporatlon v. 
Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 252 (Utah App. 1997). 
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Defendants' Answer did not assert the statute of frauds 
as an affirmative defense. (R. 15-20). The first time it 
was raised was in the proposed findings of facts and 
conclusions of law (R. 101) , which were filed and served 
less than 2 days prior to trial (R. 96, 104) . No motion 
was made at any time to amend the pleadings. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY 
ADMITTED PAROL EVIDENCE BECAUSE 
THE CLOSING STATEMENT WAS NOT 
AN INTEGRATED AGREEMENT AND 
FURTHERMORE WAS AMBIGUOUS 
A. The Closing Statement Was Not an Integrated Agreement. 
The trial court found that the closing statement was 
not an integrated agreement. (R. 134). This was a finding 
of fact, reviewable under a "clearly erroneous" standard. 
Spears, supra, 44 P.3d at 750. 
The trial court's finding was not clearly erroneous. A 
writing qualifies as an integration only if it is shown that 
the parties adopted "a particular writing or writings as the 
final and complete expression of their bargain." Bullfrog 
Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 501 P.2d 266, 270 (Utah 1972) 
(emphasis added). 
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In determining whether a writing is integrated, the 
trial court may consider parol evidence of the circumstances 
under which the writing was made and the purposes for which 
it was signed. Spears, supra, 44 P. 3d at 750. 
In this case, the evidence at trial established that 
the closing statement was neither a "final" nor a "complete" 
expression of the agreement between Huish and Bennetts. It 
was not final, because the closing statement applied only to 
the WaterPro loan. The WaterPro loan was intended merely as 
a stopgap, to give Bennetts time to close a long-term loan 
that Huish promised would be done by Thanksgiving. (FOF 
112; R. 102). It was the long-term loan, not the WaterPro 
loan, that was the focus of their ongoing agency 
relationship. (FOF 18, 9, 10, 12, 14; R. 130-134). 
Nor was the closing statement "complete". It did not 
purport to be an agreement between Huish and Bennetts, but 
merely a closing statement for a loan from WaterPro to 
Bennetts. It did not contain an integration clause, or a 
mutual release, or any statement indicating that it 
represented a final agreement of the parties. It did not 
even have a signature line for Huish or Utah Funding. 
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Aside from the foregoing deficiencies, the closing 
statement was incomplete because its key provision was 
merely an abbreviation: "To Utah Funding and Loan for 30 day 
Loan extension Beck Street." Huish's lengthy explanation of 
the meaning of this provision highlights its incompleteness. 
Huish claimed the provision meant that Bennetts had agreed 
to pay an extension fee for the UTCO Loan, not the WaterPro 
loan, for the month of November 2000 only, in the amount of 
$27,955.98, or 3% of the outstanding balance on the UTCO 
Loan, said extension fee to be divided between Huish (or 
Utah Funding) and UTCO, with UTCO to receive $9,314 (or 1% 
of the UTCO Loan balance), and Huish (or Utah Funding) to 
receive $18,641.98 (or 2% of the loan balance). (FOF 214; 
R. 133; Tr. 161-165). 
The trial court rejected Huish's explanation of the 
meaning of the closing statement. The trial court instead 
accepted Bennetts' interpretation: that the $27,955.98 was 
not intended as a commission to Utah Funding or as a 3% 
extension fee for November only; rather, it was an amount to 
be used by Huish as necessary for payment of extension fees 
to UTCO in November and/or December, and for Huish's 
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commission on the closing of the promised long-term loan. 
(FOF 514; R. 134). 
The trial court's findings are supported by the 
evidence received at trial. The history of the parties 
showed that Bennetts had delivered checks made payable to 
Utah Funding but intended solely for UTCO. (FOF 18, 10/ R. 
129, 131; Tr. 39-42, 80-82). Bennetts did not know that 
Utah Funding was Huish's company, but instead believed it 
was a "dba" for UTCO. (Tr. 138-139). They were not told 
that the $27,955.98 was for November only, or that most of 
it would go to Huish; rather, they were told the money would 
be used by Huish to pay extension fees to UTCO for November 
and December as needed until the closing of the long-term 
loan. (Tr. 43-48, 80-82). 
Regardless of which version of the agreement was 
accurate, it is clear that the agreement was not set forth 
completely in the closing statement. For that reason, the 
closing statement was not an integrated agreement, and parol 
evidence was needed, and properly taken, in order to 
determine and enforce the true intent of the parties. 
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B. The Closing Statement was Ambiguous. 
The trial court concluded that the closing statement 
was ambiguous. (FOF 113; R. 134). In doing so, the trial 
court properly considered extrinsic evidence of the history 
and circumstances. Ward v. Intermovmtain Farmers 
Association, 907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1995) . Based on that 
evidence, as well as the writing itself, the court 
determined that the parties' conflicting interpretations 
were both tenable, and therefore the writing was ambiguous. 
(FOF 113-14; R. 133-134). 
The court acted within its proper discretion. As 
discussed above, the language at issue - "$27,955.98 to Utah 
Funding for 30 day Loan extension Beck Street" - is cryptic 
and incomplete. Both parties' explanations of what that 
language was supposed to mean are "reasonably supported by 
the language of the contract", when viewed in the light of 
"the surrounding circumstances." Ward, supra, 907 P.2d at 
268. 
Because the closing statement was not integrated and 
the key provision was ambiguous, the trial court properly 
considered parol evidence to determine and enforce the true 
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intent of the parties. Spears, supra, 44 P. 3d at 750; Ward, 
supra, 907 P. 2d at 268. 
III. 
HUISH BREACHED HIS FIDUCIARY DUTY 
The trial court concluded that Huish breached his 
fiduciary duty to Bennetts. (See trial court's Conclusions 
of Law (hereinafter "COL"), 12; R. 135). This conclusion 
should be reviewed under an "abuse of discretion" standard, 
since the trial court was applying the law to the facts of 
the case. Arls, supra, 121 P.3d at 28. 
The trial court's conclusion is amply supported by the 
following findings of fact, each of which is supported by 
the evidence at trial: 
1. Huish was acting as Bennetts' agent in connection 
with the WaterPro loan. (FOF 512; R. 132, 134; Tr. 180). 
2. Bennetts entrusted $27,955.98 of WaterPro loan 
proceeds to Huish. (FOF I12, 14; R. 134; Tr. 43-48). 
3. Huish promised Bennetts that he would hold their 
money and use it to pay UTCO Loan extension fees until such 
time as the long-term loan closed. (Id.) 
4. In reliance on this promise, Bennetts entrusted the 
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money to Huish. (Id.) 
5. Rather than using the money as he had promised, 
Huish kept most of it for himself. (Id.) 
6. In early December, 2000, Huish told Bennetts that 
Robert Kent was demanding $50,000 as a loan extension fee 
for the month of December. (FOF 515/ R. 133; Tr. 50-51). 
7. Huish knew Bennetts had no money to pay a $50,000 
fee, and no more properties to pledge as collateral for any 
more loans to raise that much money. (Id; Exhibit 106; Tr. 
20, 26, 27, 52, 57-58, 158). 
8. Huish had authority from Robert Kent to decide the 
amount of rollover fees. (FOF 28, 14; R. 129, 133; Tr. 
164, 185, 187) . 
9. Huish failed to disclose to Bennetts that he had 
authority from Robert Kent to set the amount of rollover 
fees. (Id.; Tr. 80-82). 
10. It was Huish, not Kent, who decided to demand a 
$50,000 rollover fee in December. (FOF 115; R. 133; Tr. 
164, 185, 187) . 
11. Huish failed to disclose to Bennetts that it was 
Huish, not Kent, who had decided to demand $50,000 as a 
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rollover fee for December. (Tr. 50-51). 
12. When Bennetts demanded return of their funds, 
Huish refused to return their funds. (FOF 516; Tr. 50-51). 
Although Huish asserted that he had explained to 
Bennetts that he and Utah Funding would get most of the 
$27,955.98, and they had agreed to it (Tr. 180), the trial 
court rejected this testimony (FOF 214; R. 133-134). The 
court instead found that the testimony of the Bennetts was 
more credible than that of Huish. (Id.) Bennetts testified 
that they were instructed by Huish never to attempt contact 
with Robert Kent. (Tr. 25). They believed Utah Funding 
was a "dba" of UTCO and did not understand that Huish owned 
and controlled Utah Funding. (Tr. 138-139). They were 
told that the $27,955.98 would be used for extension fees to 
UTCO until the long-term loan could be closed in late 
November or early December. (Tr. 43-48, 80-82, 84-86, 
98-99). They were never told, nor did they agree, that 
Huish would be getting any of that money. (Id.) When 
Bennetts demanded return of their funds, Huish refused. 
(Tr. 51-52). 
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It is fundamental that an agent owes his principal a 
duty of full disclosure. The rule is stated as follows: 
"The duty of an agent to make full disclosure to the 
principal of all material facts relevant to the agency is 
fundamental to the fiduciary relationship of principal and 
agent." 3 AmJur 2d at 595, Agency §206. 
Utah law fully supports this salutary rule: 
Because of the specialized service the real estate 
broker offers in acting as an agent for his client 
there arises a fiduciary relationship between 
them; [cite omitted] it is incumbent upon him to 
apply his abilities and knowledge to the advantage 
of the man he serves; and to make full disclosure 
of all facts which his principal should know in 
transacting the business, [cite omitted]. 
Reese v. Harper, 329 P.2d 410, 412 (Utah 1958) (emphasis 
added); accord, Phillips Petroleum Company v. Peterson, 218 
F.2d 926, 934 (10th Cir. 1954). 
The trial court's conclusion that Huish breached his 
fiduciary duty to Bennetts was fully supported by the law 
and the evidence and should not be overturned. 
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IV. 
HUISH AND UTAH FUNDING 
CONVERTED BENNETTS' FUNDS 
The trial court concluded that Defendants converted 
Bennetts' funds. (COL 53; R. 135-136). This conclusion is 
reviewable for abuse of discretion. Aris, supra, 121 P.3d 
at 28. 
The trial court's conclusion was based on the following 
findings of fact: (1) Huish agreed to hold $27,955.98 in 
loan fund belonging to Bennetts, and to use those funds only 
for agreed-upon purposes (FOF 214; R. 134); (2) Huish used 
$9,314 of the funds for the proper purpose, paying them to 
UTCO for the November extension. (FOF $14; R. 133); and 
(3) Huish wrongfully kept the remaining $18,641.98 for 
himself (Id.), and refused to return it when Bennetts 
demanded it. (FOF 116; R. 135). 
Defendants have not challenged the foregoing findings, 
but instead have argued that the evidence supporting them 
was inadmissible under the parol evidence rule. 
(Appellant's Brief at 26). As shown in Argument II above, 
the trial court correctly rejected this argument. 
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HUISH'S CONDUCT JUSTIFIED THE 
IMPOSITION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
Awarding punitive damages is a two-step process: 
first, the trier of fact must find "conduct which manifests 
a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and disregard 
of, the rights of others." Crookston, supra, 817 P.2d at 
807; and second, the trier of fact may then assess punitive 
damages that are appropriate in amount. Id. 
The trial court in the present case concluded that 
imposition of punitive damages was proper because "the 
overall conduct of Huish was in reckless disregard of the 
rights of others." (COL f6; R. 137). This conclusion was 
supported by the same findings, and the same evidence, as 
that showing breach of fiduciary duty. (See Argument III, 
pages 25-27, supra.). In particular, Huish's own testimony 
regarding his authority to set rollover fees shows that he 
acted with knowing and reckless indifference towards 
Bennetts' rights. 
On direct examination, Huish testified as follows: 
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THE WITNESS: Mr. Kent had a preference to do his 
negotiation through me. I had a very tight 
relationship with Mr. Kent. He allowed me to 
negotiate for him and that' s what I did. 
Tr. 164 (emphasis added). 
Under cross examination, Huish testified as follows: 
Q You had a very tight relationship with Mr. 
Kent. 
A I did. 
Q He allowed you to decide how much to charge? 
A On my behalf he did. 
Tr. 185. 
Mr. Huish also testified as follows: 
A I was pretty - I was pretty workable with Mr. 
Kent each time and we agreed what he was taking. 
That's what he needed to do. I didn't determine 
if one percent was fine for him, he did. 
Q Well, you said he allowed you latitude and 
you're the one who [decided] three percent for 
this one loan? 
A Yes, he did. He did. 
Tr. 187. 
The foregoing facts support the imposition of punitive 
damages. Because Huish was Bennetts' agent, they had a 
right to his loyalty, honesty and full disclosure. Reese v. 
Harper, 329 P.2d 410, 412 (Utah 1958). 
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The evidence shows that Huish completely disregarded 
Bennetts' rights, and he did so knowingly: 
Q Now talking about the WaterPro deal. You testified 
that you acted as a loan broker in doing the WaterPro deal, 
didn't you? 
A Yes. 
Q And you were acting on behalf of the Bennetts, 
weren't you? 
A Right. 
Q And so you concede that you understand that you 
owed them fiduciary duties; isn't that right? 
A Sure. 
Q Including full disclosure? 
A Sure, absolutely. 
(Tr. 179-180). 
Knowing he owed fiduciary duties to Bennetts, and 
understanding that they had the right to full disclosure, 
Huish misled them, took their money, withheld important 
information from them, and then, when he knew that their 
money was gone and they could no longer provide loan 
commissions to him, he imposed a $50,000 fee which he knew 
they could not pay. He did all this without any remorse, 
and continued even at trial to assert that he had acted 
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properly. As the trial court observed: 
It appears as if Huish intends to continue to 
believe he acted properly. His attitude and 
demeanor at trial was clear to the court - he had 
done nothing improper, and charging fees without 
disclosing such was perfectly legitimate and was 
the wa[y] business was done. 
(COL 16; R. 137-138). 
Since there was substantial evidence to support the 
court's decision to impose punitive damages, that decision 
should not be overturned on appeal. 
VI. 
THE AMOUNT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
AWARDED BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS APPROPRIATE 
The second step in the two-step process for assessing 
punitive damages is to determine an appropriate amount. In 
the present case, the trial court awarded $50,000 as 
punitive damages. (COL $8; R. 138). This amount was 
imposed only after careful consideration by the trial court 
of the factors identified by the Utah Supreme Court in the 
Crookston case: (1) the relative wealth of the defendant; 
(2) the nature of the misconduct; (3) the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the misconduct; (4) the effect of 
the misconduct on the lives of others; (5) the likelihood of 
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any recurrence of the conduct; (6) the relationship of the 
parties; and (7) the amount of actual, general and 
compensatory, damages. (COL 56; R. 137; compare with 
Crookston, supra.,, 817 P. 2d at 808) . 
The trial court's findings in support of each Crookston 
factor, and support for that finding, are set forth below: 
1. Relative wealth: The trial court found that "while 
there was no testimony as to the relative wealth of Huish, 
he obtained fees from plaintiffs in an amount over $100,000 
for conduc[t]ing business with UTCO with whom he had an 
insider relationship." (COL fB; R. 138). The evidence at 
trial supported this finding. 
In his own testimony at trial, Huish admitted that over 
a period of six months, he and his companies received 
income, from Bennetts alone, totaling in excess of $120,000: 
$72,000 from the bridge loan in May (Tr. 171), $6,000 from 
the August rollover fee (Tr. 175), $19,000 from the 
September re-finance (Tr. 178), $4,900 as a broker's fee 
for obtaining the WaterPro loan (Tr. 162), and more than 
$18,000 as the claimed commission that was the subject of 
the litigation (Tr. 163-165). 
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This evidence justified punitive damages of $50,000. 
In half a year, Huish earned income from Bennetts alone 
which was more than double the amount of the punitive 
damages imposed on him. 
Huish's income was not limited to what he received from 
Bennetts: 
I did these types of loans all the time. If it 
wouldn't have been the Bennetts, it would have 
been someone else. I've done it for a long time 
with Mr. Kent. 
(Tr. 171) (emphasis added). 
The foregoing evidence of income was sufficient to 
support punitive damages of $50,000, particularly in light 
of applicable case law. In Hall v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
959 P.2d 109 (Utah 1998), the jury assessed punitive damages 
against Wal-Mart without evidence of its wealth or income. 
959 P.2d at 110. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed, holding as follows: 
While evidence of the defendant's wealth is a 
relevant factor in the award of punitive damages, 
it is not a necessary factor. The plaintiff is 
not required to introduce evidence of a 
defendant's relative wealth, but would be wise to 
do so, as under Crookston I, an award which is 
presumptively excessive and might otherwise be 
struck down, can be justified by the defendant's 
relative wealth. On the other hand, the defendant 
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who appears to have wealth but in fact does not, 
should not expect the plaintiff to point this out 
to the jury for him. He himself must present to 
the jury evidence of his inability to pay a large 
award of punitive damages. 
Hall, supra, 959 P.2d at 113 (emphasis added). 
Since Defendants failed to present evidence at trial of 
their own impecuniosity, and since there was sufficient 
evidence to justify the amount awarded, it should not be 
overturned on appeal. 
2. Nature of the misconduct. See Argument III above. 
3. Facts and circumstances surrounding the misconduct. 
The court found that Bennetts were not well educated and not 
sophisticated in business matters. (FOF II; R. 126; Tr. 
15-16, 67). Huish took advantage of them for his own 
benefit. (FOF 114; R. 133). In reliance on Huish's 
promises of a long-term loan (which never materialized) 
Bennetts agreed to the UTCO Loan, which led to all the 
subsequent problems. (FOF 54-5; R. 128). Because the UTCO 
Loan was only a 90-day loan, it had to be extended twice 
prior to the WaterPro loan, and on both occasions Huish took 
commissions from Bennetts without disclosing it to them. 
(FOF 58, 10; R. 130-132). Repeated misconduct justifies 
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higher punitive damages. Campbell v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company,, 98 P. 3d 409, 416 (Utah 2004) . 
4. Effect of the misconduct on the lives of others: 
The trial court found that Huish's conduct harmed Bennetts 
in a far greater amount than the $50,000 punitive damage 
award reveals. (COL f8; R. 138). The evidence showed 
that, having entered into the UTCO Loan on the strength of 
Huish's promises of a long-term loan, Bennetts ended up 
being financially ruined by it. They lost the Beck Street 
property that was purchased with the UTCO Loan. (Tr. 55). 
They lost all of the $500,000 in equity they'd had in their 
other properties. (Tr. 57-59). Their company had to go 
through a Chapter 11 bankruptcy. (Tr. 52). Huish's 
misconduct negatively affected their health, family 
relationships and business development. (Tr. 53-54). 
5. Likelihood of recurrence: The trial court found 
that "Huish'[s] attitude was one of defiance and thus is 
likely to recur in an ongoing basis". (COL 18; R. 138). 
The trial court's observations of witness character and 
demeanor are entitled to deference, and conclusions based on 
those observations should not be easily overturned. State 
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v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-936 (Utah 1994). 
6. Relationship of the parties: As discussed above, 
Huish was Bennetts' agent, with fiduciary duties of loyalty, 
honesty and full disclosure. 
7. The amount of actual damages: In the present case, 
actual damages were $18,643.98. (Order and Judgment; R. 
142). Punitive damages were $50,000. (Id.) Since 
punitives were well under $100,000, and were less than 3 
times actual damages, they were presumptively appropriate. 
Crookston, supra, 817 P.2d at 810-811. 
Reading Crookston and Hall together, the law in Utah is 
as follows: where the punitive damages award is well under 
$100,000, and is less than 3 times the amount of actual 
damages, it is presumed appropriate and no evidence of 
relative wealth or income is required to sustain it. If the 
defendant believes his lack of wealth or income might 
influence the trier of fact to consider a smaller amount of 
punitives, then the burden is on the defendant, not the 
plaintiff, to come forward with that evidence. 
Defendants have asserted the "reprehensibility" is a 
factor to be considered in addition to the Crookston factors 
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discussed above. (Appellant's Brief at 28). 
"Reprehensibility" is not part of the state law 
analysis of punitive damages; rather, it is a factor in 
federal constitutionality analysis. Campbell, supra, 98 
P.3d at 413-414. 
Although Appellant's Brief raised "reprehensibility" in 
a cursory manner, it did not discuss the factors identified 
by the United States Supreme Court as bearing on the issue. 
(Appellant's Brief at 27-29). For that reason, the issue 
should not be considered on appeal. Smith v. Fairfax 
Realty, Inc., 82 P.3d 1064, 1071 (Utah 2003). 
If the issue of "reprehensibility" is considered on 
appeal, the following factors should be discussed: (1) 
whether the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; 
(2) whether the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to 
or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; 
(3) the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; 
(4) the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated 
incident; and (5) the harm was the result of intentional 
malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident. Campbell, 
supra, 98 P.3d at 414. 
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Analysis of each of the foregoing factors shows that 
they support an award of $50,000: 
1. Nature of the harm caused: as in Campbell, the loss 
in the present case was primarily economic, but the harm 
extended beyond that, to negatively affect the lives of 
everyone in the Bennetts' families. (See no. 4, page 37, 
supra; see also Campbell, supra, 98 P.3d at 414-415). 
2. Indifference or reckless disregard: see Argument V, 
pages 30-33, supra. 
3. Financial vulnerability: By the time of the 
WaterPro loan, Bennetts had sacrificed all of the equity in 
all of their properties to keep the UTCO Loan alive in hopes 
of closing the long-term loan Huish had been promising them 
since May. (FOF 115; 133; Trial exhibit 106; Tr. 20, 26, 
27, 52, 57-58, 158). Huish shut them down with a $50,000 
demand when he knew they had no more money and no more 
property. ( Id . ) . 
4. Repeated conduct: See no. 3, pages 36-37, supra. 
5. Intentional or mere accident: See Argument III, 
pages 25-27, supra. 
As shown above, the degree of reprehensibility in the 
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present case supports the level of punitive damages. Where 
punitives are well under $100,000, and are less than 3 times 
actual damages, it is not necessary to show an unusual level 
of reprehensibility. Crookston, supra, 817 P.2d at 810-811. 
VII. 
BENNETTS ARE ENTITLED TO 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST 
The trial court awarded prejudgment interest. (Order 
and Judgment; R. 142). Whether to award prejudgment 
interest is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. 
Carlson, supra, 95 P.3d at 1176. As shown below, the trial 
court was correct in awarding prejudgment interest. 
The rule for determining a party's right to prejudgment 
interest is as follows: 
Where the damage is complete and the amount of 
loss fixed as of a particular time, and that loss 
can be measured by facts and figures, interest 
should be allowed from that time and not from the 
date of judgment. 
Klinger v. Klghtly, 889 P.2d 1372, 1381 (Utah App. 1995) 
(emphasis added), quoting from Prlce-Orem Inv. Co. v. 
Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc., 784 P.2d 475, 482 (Utah App. 
1989) . 
Defendants argue that prejudgment interest was improper 
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in this case because the amount sought differed from the 
amount awarded. (Appellant's Brief at 29-30). Defendants 
misapprehend the basis for awarding prejudgment interest. 
The important distinction is not the contrast between the 
amount initially claimed and the amount finally awarded, but 
rather the nature of the loss. 
In "personal injury cases, cases of death by wrongful 
act, libel, slander, false imprisonment ... and all cases 
where the damages are incomplete and are peculiarly within 
the province of the jury to assess at the time of trial, no 
interest is permissible." Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 82 
P.3d 1064, 1069 (Utah 2003), quoting with approval from Fell 
v. Union Pacific Railway Co., 88 P. 1003, 1006 (Utah 1907) 
(emphasis added). 
In contrast, losses which are complete, and fixed, as 
of a particular time, and which can be "measured by facts 
and figures", are entitled to prejudgment interest. 
Klinger, supra, 889 P.2d at 1381. 
The distinction is essentially the same as that between 
"hard" and "soft" losses in punitive damages analysis. 
"Hard" losses are described as "concrete" or "economic" 
-42-
losses, Crookston, supra, 817 P.2d at 795, 805, 811-812; 
whereas "soft" losses are for such things as "emotional and 
mental distress and loss of financial reputation, ... [and] 
pain and suffering." Id., at 805-806. 
Lefavl v. Bertoch, 994 P.2d 817 (Utah App. 2000), 
provides a good example of "hard" or "economic" loss. In 
Lefavl, the plaintiff was an investor who sued for his 
proportional share of profits. 994 P.2d at 820. At trial, 
the parties presented conflicting evidence as to what those 
profits were. Id. During trial, the parties entered into a 
stipulation fixing the amounts each had invested and the 
proceeds received from sale of the project. Id. Based on 
that stipulation, the trial court calculated the damages and 
awarded prejudgment interest. Id., at 821. On appeal, the 
defendants urged prejudgment interest should not have been 
awarded because the amount of damages was not calculable 
prior to trial. Id., at 822. 
The Court of Appeals in Lefavl affirmed the trial 
court, observing that: 
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Prejudgment interest is awarded to compensate a 
party for the depreciating value of the amount 
owed over time, and, as a corollary, to deter 
parties from intentionally withholding an amount 
that is liquidated and owing. [cite omitted] 
Lefavi, supra, 994 P.2d at 822 (emphasis added). 
This case, like Lefavi, features a defendant guilty of 
"intentionally withholding an amount that [was] liquidated 
and owing." 994 P.2d at 822. Bennetts' losses were fixed 
as of the date in early December when Huish refused to 
return the Bennetts' money. The amount of the loss is 
exactly quantifiable: $27,955.98 (the amount held out by 
Huish) less $9,314.00 (the amount Huish paid to UTCO) = 
$18,643.98. The fact that Bennetts sought the full amount 
-$27,955.98-in their Complaint, is irrelevant. By the time 
of trial, Bennetts had learned that Huish had disbursed at 
least some of the money appropriately, and therefore reduced 
their claim to the actual loss. (Tr. 84). The Court in 
this case properly awarded prejudgment interest to 
compensate Bennetts for the depreciating value of the fixed 
amount of their loss: $18,643.98. 
-44-
VIII. 
HUISH IS PERSONALLY LIABLE TO BENNETTS 
A. The Corporate Shield Does Not Protect An Individual From 
His Own Tortious Conduct. 
In a post-trial motion to alter or amend, Defendants 
argued for the first time that Grant Huish could not be held 
personally liable, because he was acting on behalf of a 
corporation and was therefore entitled to the corporate 
shield. (R. 162-163). The trial court disagreed, holding 
that an individual is liable for his own torts. (R. 245). 
This is a question of law, reviewed for correctness, and as 
shown below, the trial court's ruling was correct. 
In support of this argument, Defendants have cited the 
case of Hernandez v. Baker, 104 P.2d 664 (Utah App. 2004). 
(Appellant's Brief at 30). In Hernandez, default judgment 
was taken against an individual. 104 P.3d at 666. The 
individual filed a motion for relief from the judgment, 
alleging excusable neglect and various defenses. Id. The 
trial court denied the motion to set aside the judgment, but 
on appeal the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. Id., 
at 669. 
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The Court of Appeals in Hernandez held that the 
individual defendant had stated a meritorious corporate 
shield defense, based on the defendant's affidavit where he 
"specifically denied that [he] in his individual capacity 
had any dealings whatsoever with Hernandez." Id., at 667. 
In contrast to Hernandez, in the present case no one 
else but Huish was involved. If, indeed, in Hernandezf the 
individual never had any dealings with the plaintiff, then 
it would be appropriate that he not be held personally 
liable. This is because the officers and directors of a 
corporation are not personally liable for torts committed by 
other corporate employees or agents, so long as they 
themselves were not aware of the tortious activity. 
Defendants, however, interpret Hernandez as holding 
that an individual who commits a tort while acting within 
the scope of his employment by a corporation is protected by 
the corporate shield. (Appellant's Brief at 30). Such a 
rule would contradict established Utah precedent. 
In Armed Forces Insurance Exchange v. Harrison, 70 P.3d 
35 (Utah 2003), a corporation and its president were sued 
for fraud and other claims. 70 P.3d at 38. The individual 
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defendant asserted the corporate shield as a defense. Id., 
at 38-39. After a bench trial, judgments were entered 
against the individual and the company, jointly and 
severally, on the fraud claim. Id., at 39. On appeal, the 
Supreme Court explained the difference between torts 
committed by others and unknown to a corporate officer, and 
torts committed by the officer personally: 
Initially, we note than an officer or director of 
a corporation is not personally liable for torts 
of the corporation or of its other officers and 
agents merely by virtue of holding corporate 
office, but can only incur personal liability by 
participating in the wrongful activity, [cite 
omitted] When fraud is alleged, a director or 
officer of a corporation is individually liable 
for fraudulent acts or false representations of 
his own or In which he participates, [emphasis in 
original] even though his action in such respect 
may be in furtherance of the corporate business, 
[cite omitted] 
Other states, considering the issue of corporate 
officer liability, have found that an officer 
cannot hide his or her own fraudulent acts behind 
the corporate veil. ... In Mecham v. Benson, 590 
P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1979), this court noted that a 
defendant, by attempting to hide behind the 
corporate entity, *would not exculpate himself by 
proving that he was acting as agent of a 
corporation; he would only additionally inculpate 
his corporate principal.7 
Harrison, supra, 70 P.3d at 41 (underlined emphasis added)• 
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The rule in Harrison is followed unanimously in Utah 
and every other jurisdiction so far as Bennetts' research 
can determine. See, e.g., BPS, Inc. v. Worthy, 608 S.E.2d 
155, 160 (S.C. App. 2005) ("Nothing in the law shields [the 
individual defendant] from direct liability in tort for his 
own actions"); accord, Madlgan v. Tang, 805 N.E.2d 243, 250 
(111. App. 2004) . 
B. The Corporate Shield Defense Was Never Raised Prior to 
Trial. 
The corporate shield defense now being made by 
Defendants was not raised in the Answer or at any time prior 
to trial. It was raised for the first time in the 
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for a New Trial 
or to Alter or Amend Judgment. (R. 153, 162-163). For 
this reason, the trial court held that the corporate shield 
defense had been waived. (R. 245). 
A finding of waiver is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. Aspenwood, supra, 73 P.3d at 954. In this 
case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion, because 
the defense was never raised until after trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial 
court should be sustained in all respects. 
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